Introduction
In an address to the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 1960, the then President of the United States of America, Dwight Eisenhower, stated that:
The emergence of this new world [outer space] poses a vital issue: will outer space be preserved for peaceful use and developed for the benefit of all mankind? Or will it become another focus for the arms race and thus an area of dangerous and sterile competition? The choice is urgent. And it is ours to make. The nations of the world have recently united in declaring the continent of Antarctica off limits to military preparations. We could extend this principle to an even more important sphere. National vested interests have not yet been developed in space or in celestial bodies. Barriers to agreement are now lower than they will ever be again. The opportunity may be fleeting. Before many years have passed, the point of no return may have passed.
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Although the race to the moon dominated the attention of the two major space powers, the (then) USSR and the USA, during the 1960s, 2 the potential use of space for military purposes has continued to be intrinsically linked to the development of space technology 3 and space flight 4 since the end of the Second World War.
The launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, by the USSR in 1957 "caused a crisis in Western military thinking" 5 as it indicated that a surprise attack from space was a real possibility. This event was the impetus for the so-called "space race"
between the USA and the USSR, causing these two world powers to invest huge As will be further discussed below, the Outer Space Treaty 23 prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in outer space and determines that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes only. 24 Although the installation and testing of military equipment and space weapons in outer space is clearly unlawful, the problem remains that most space assets have the potential to be used for military purposes. 25 For example, while satellite technology in the form of remote sensing can be used to gather meteorological data, it can also be used to gather intelligence in other states. Similarly, Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) or Global Position Systems (GPS) can be used for civilian purposes, but also to direct bombs or cruise missiles. 26 Telecommunication satellites are used to transmit not only civilian communications but also military messages. 27 Remote sensing by means of satellite is also used in the civilian as well as military spheres. 28 It is clear that the distinction between military and non-military uses of space, is becoming increasingly blurred. 29 The question therefore remains whether the military use of space equipment is contrary to the provision in the Outer Space Treaty that outer space must be used for peaceful purposes exclusively. Moreover, due to the importance for states to protect their space assets from possible neutralisation by other states, the potential for conflict is self-evident. 30 In this regard Goodman 31 aptly notes: 23 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1969) (Outer Space Treaty).
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A IV of the Outer Space Treaty. 25 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 500. Also see Goodman 2010 Journal of Space Law 108, who confirms that " [i] t is widely known that any object in space can become a space weapon". 26 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 500, 519. The authors point out that "the present operation systems, US GPS, Russian GLONASS and the Chinese Beidou are systems designed, operated and owned by the military to which civilians have been granted access" (Lyall and Larsen Space Law 519) .
Also see on the dual use of satellite navigation systems. 27 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 500. The use of telecommunications systems is subject to the rules and procedures of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). See further in this regard Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/criticalissues/5448-outer-space. 28 Lyall and Larsen Space Law [521] [522] . Also see Soucek "International Law" 317; Ospina 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 178. As space assets become increasingly integrated into national and economic systems and military defences, space will become an increasingly attractive battleground.
Delimiting outer space
Since some military activities which are permitted on earth, may be prohibited in outer space, it is necessary to know where outer space is. The term outer space generally refers to the entire universe, in other words, any area beyond the earth's atmosphere.
However, since spaceflight can be undertaken only in a very limited part of outer space, this general meaning is too broad for legal purposes. In a legal sense, outer space refers to that part of the universe where human activities are practically possible or feasible. 32 Some activities which are based on earth are, however, intrinsically linked to outer space activities and the question remains whether space law should be applicable to these activities also. 33 The delimitation of outer space essentially concerns the question of where air space ends and where outer space begins. The answer to this question is significant in order to determine which activities are indeed space activities under international space law, and which activities are governed by other legal regimes. In contrast to air space, which falls under the territorial sovereignty of the underlying state, international law determines that outer space is not subject to the sovereignty of any particular state. 34 It may therefore be regarded as customary international law that states do not need the prior consent of other states in order to conduct activities in outer space. 35 32 Neger and Walter "Space Law" 238. 33 Neger and Walter "Space Law" 238-239. According to the authors these activities include those which "can be considered as facilitating access to and the return from outer space, like all kinds of launching and return facilities (spaceports as well as spacecrafts)" and those activities which "regulate the operation and control of human conduct in outer space, like all activities concerning the functioning of satellites and other outer space systems (eg ISS)" (Neger and Walter "Space Law" 239) . 34 Neger and Walter "Space Law" 239. 35 In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands), Merits, 1969 ICJ Reports 3 230 it was stated by Lachs J that " [t] he first instruments that man sent into outer space traversed the airspace of States and circled above them in outer space, yet the launching States sought no permission, not did the States protest. This is how the freedom of movement into outer space, and in it, came to be established and recognized as law within a remarkably short period of time". Also see Freeland 2010 Melb J Int'l L 10-11.
Clear international consensus on the definition of outer space has, however, not yet been reached. 36 An attempt to formally define the term can be found in the first Draft put 94 km from the surface of the earth. Conservatively, the figure may be put at 100 or 110 km". He also points out that states may, as they have done with regard to the delimitation of the territorial sea, decide to claim a higher or lower limit, or tacitly or expressly agree on a specific border separating national air space from outer space.
Also see Lyall and Larsen Space Law 499-500. 48 See further Lyall and Larsen Space Law 501-506 for a concise discussion of the use of force in general international law. In contrast with Lyall and Larsen Space Law 59 who state that it is a fundamental principle that "international law applies to outer space", Soucek "International Law" 321 prefers the formulation that "[i]nternational law applies to human activities in outer space". He explains that the latter formulation would avoid the perception that "human rules of law stretch across the universe. The universe adopts the laws of gravity and relativity, but not international law. States however have to obey, and this stretches as far as they go into outer space". From the reading of article IV, the following issues present a number of legal challenges which deserve further attention. Due to the shortcomings of defining "peaceful" as meaning either non-aggressive or non-military, Friman 72 proposes that a concilliatory approach should be followed in redefining the term "peaceful" in order to comply with the object and purpose of the Outer Space Treaty, which is "to safeguard the exploration and use of outer space as a perpetual and peaceful province of all mankind". 73 She consequently concludes that all lawful non-military uses of outer space would be regarded as peaceful, while military uses of outer space will be considered to be peaceful only if they meet certain treaty-based criteria. 74 Since the weaponisation of outer space would fail to meet most 
Peaceful purposes

Militarisation versus weaponisation
From the above discussion, it seems that article IV does not place an unqualified ban on military activities in outer space, but that it limits certain military activities. 78 A distinction should therefore be drawn between the militarisation and the weaponisation 79 of outer space.
In terms of a strict interpretation of the peaceful principle in article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, the non-militarisation (or demilitarisation 80 ) of outer space would mean "the prohibition of using space-based facilities for any military purpose". 81 However, Su 82 points out that state practice indicates that states have not followed this strict interpretation of the non-militarisation of outer space and that outer space was in fact militarised since the launch of the first communication satellites. The militarisation of outer space may therefore be described as the passive military use of outer space. The issue of self-defence in outer space is addressed further here below.
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Lyall and Larsen Space Law 514; Soucek "International Law" 320. 79 In addition to the terms militarisation and weaponisation, Friman 2005 FYBIL 290-291 also employs the term neutralisation, which is defined as "the process whereby a space is excluded from the theatre of war and armed conflict". According to Friman it is clear that all celestial bodies are neutralised under article IV, as its wording clearly prohibits any use which has the immediate or ultimate aim of warfare. Activities such as reconnaissance and surveillance, which are currently performed by a number of states, may thus be described as militarising outer space. Based on the perceived non-aggressive nature of these activities, such activities are accepted as legal by the large majority of states and thus as not contrary to article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. 83 Su 84 therefore submits that:
On account of the contribution of passive military uses of outer space to international peace and security, and the interconnection between military activities in outer space and those on earth, demilitarisation of outer space is unlikely.
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Thus, ironically, military uses of outer space which are in fact not really peaceful (such as the use of satellites to direct bombing raids) are currently accepted by states. 86 Ultimately, the lawfulness of these passive military uses of outer space will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis 87 by, for example, referring to the main purpose of the space object. 88 The weaponisation of outer space may be described as "the deployment of weapons of an offensive nature in outer space or on the ground with their intended target located in space". 89 The large majority of states regard these activities as illegal since they are contrary to the basic principles of public international and outer space law. 90 Although is not yet weaponized". He explains this statement as follows: "In other words, although space-based devices such as satellites may be used for aggressive military measures, they lack direct destructive capacity and thus are not considered to be space weapons." as the ASAT test by China, the suspected pursuance of similar capabilities by other states, 92 and the vulnerability of space systems to cyber attacks have created international fear that the weaponisation of space is a real possibility, 93 with obvious implications for space security. 94 Such threats may include the destruction of satellites by anti-satellite weapons, the rendering of satellites as temporarily inoperable through jamming or cyber-attacks, as well as the mere placement of offensive or defensive weapons in outer space, regardless of whether they are eventually used or not. 95 Some experts also argue that weapons that travel through outer space in order to reach their targets (such as hypersonic technology vehicles) also add to the weaponisation of outer space. 96 Due to the generation of vast amounts of space debris it generates, the mere testing of space weapons already poses a risk to space security and to the right of other states to use and explore outer space freely. 97 Apart from states, the space arena has evolved to increasingly including non-state entities, which are becoming serious actors in outer space activities themselves. 98 Although the commercialisation of outer space has a number of advantages, it may 92 Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 365 points out that, apart from China, ASAT weapon tests have previously also been performed by the USA and then USSR. According to Tronchetti, it is also suspected that France and India are currently pursuing such capabilities. Lyall and Larsen Space Law 525 describes the four basic modes of anti-satellite technology as follows: "A kinetic weapon destroys and cripples a satellite by collision with either a single missile, or with a number of small objects towards it -the buckshot technique. Launched from the Earth or from a space platform, a kinetic weapon would have the disadvantage of producing a cloud of debris, with all its potential consequences. An alternative is the laser which could be used to knock out a satellite, again from either Earth or from space. A different possibility is the use of radio jamming to either overwhelm a satellite itself or to prevent its signals being used. Last, in a modern age dependent on electronics and the Internet, a less obvious but real possibility is cyber-attack on a perceived enemy, part of which could involve interference with command, control and use of satellite systems." See Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 365-366. Tronchetti states that "[i]n the realm of outer space, the idea of security refers to the absence of manmade or natural threats to space assets". Threats to space assets are divided into unintentional and intentional threats. The former include threats arising from space weather, space debris and malfunctioning, while the latter include "premeditated attacks targeting space objects or their respective ground stations" (Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 366). Tronchetti interprets the concept space security in a restrictive manner as the "absence of intentional threats to space objects, specifically those causing their physical destruction" (Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 366) . Also see Remuss "Space and Security" 519. also bring with it certain threats to space security. 99 In this regard Goodman 100 cautions that, even though it is not yet a commonly predicted threat, the possibility of space terrorism should not be overlooked. According to Goodman, 101 the threat posed by space terrorism could be much graver than any terrorist acts already known to the world. Therefore, control of private space actors, may eventually become a matter of national (and even international) security. 102 Specifically satellite technology is an attractive target for space terrorists, as interference with a state's satellites could disrupt military operations and essential daily activities such as financial transactions and telecommunications. 103 These possible attacks will increasingly provide the incentive for states to develop the ability not only to protect their own space assets but also to neutralise the space assets of their enemies. 104 This leads to the question whether the right to self-defence may be exercised by states in order to protect their assets in outer space. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter makes provision for the inherent right to self-defence of all states and reads as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right to self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
In the instance of anticipatory self-defence, an armed attack has not yet occurred, but the defensive action is taken in anticipation of an armed attack. The attack must, however, be imminent, and the defensive action must be proportionate to the anticipated attack. 105 Although there is divided opinion amongst scholars on whether article 51 allows for anticipatory self-defence, states have invoked such action on a number of occasions. 106 Recently a "wider notion of self-defence" 107 called pre-emptive self-defence emerged in the practice of states. In this instance a state will act preemptively due to the mere possibility of being attacked. The United States under the Bush administration justified this form of self-defence as a means to counter potential terrorist attacks and the use of weapons of mass destruction. 108 Although the International Court of Justice determined that states could not act in self-defence based on believing attacks to be likely or on wishing to protect perceived security interests, 109 there is still a real concern that states may militarise outer space as a preemptive measure, 110 even more so in view of the potential risk of space terrorism. 111 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter requires that self-defence measures must be immediately reported to the Security Council, which may take action it deems necessary to restore international peace and security. The question arises, however, whether the Security Council may take or authorise military action which may be prohibited in terms of the space law proscription in article IV that outer space may be used for peaceful purposes only. 112 According to Bourbonnière and Lee, 113 Dugard International Law 506 points out that although the International Court of Justice has been reluctant to extend a 51 to also cover self defence against attacks by non-state actors, there is nothing in a 51 that indicates that the right to self-defence may be invoked only after an attack by a state. However, he cautions that " [t] errorism is a serious threat to the international peace and security, but it is one that must be contained and confronted by multilateral action under the auspices of the Security Council and not by unilateral action under the guise of self-defence". Also weapons in outer space. It is furthermore difficult to conceive of the use of nuclear weapons in outer space, in the light of the current nuclear disarmament efforts by states. 127 Lyall and Larsen 128 also reach the conclusion that the right to self-defence applies to outer space, but they hold a more cautionary viewpoint. They also motivate their viewpoint with reference to article 30(1) of the Vienna Convention, which subjects the general rule regarding the application of successive treaties to article 103 of the United Nations Charter, and argue that a state would be permitted to act in self-defence in order to defend its personnel and space technologies if the action taken is within the boundaries set by article 51 of the Charter. 129 This includes that the defence must be proportionate to the attack. 130 They therefore caution that:
Precision weapons should be used properly, 'harmful interference' with the activities of others be avoided as far as possible, and the creation of debris should be minimised in the general interest.
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The authors furthermore point out that the decision to act in self-defence is complicated by the speed and density of modern communications. As a result, a swift military decision needs to be taken by a state 132 by relying on conflicting data which may be received simultaneously. Moreover, an act of self-defence by one state may lead to other states taking responsive action, which will inevitably result in the 127 See further Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/criticalissues/5448-outer-space on the effects of the weaponisation of outer space on arms control and nuclear disarmament. 128 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 526. 129 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 503-504. 130 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 504. 131 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 527. In this regard Duberti 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Outer Space Law 86 argues that, due to the grave effects of space debris, the destruction of a satellite should be regarded as unlawful. He therefore suggests that in exercising its legitimate right of self-defence, a state may attack a satellite that was used for military purposes by another state by using technical means that would merely complicate or disable its operation.
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According to Christol 2009 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 106, the possession of nuclear weapons in the case of an identified threat would justify a more immediate response than occurred in the Caroline incident. Consequently, the limits on the use of force as prescribed in the Caroline case would not be applicable in the event of such a threat. He asserts that " [t] he magnitude of the probable harm and the resultant shortness of time within which a responsive decision would have to be taken would require extreme protective measures owing to the threat produced by such weapons". undermining of international peace and security. 133 Lyall and Larsen 134 therefore caution that states should be reluctant to engage in pre-emptive self-defence in outer space.
This cautionary statement by the authors should also be extended to anticipatory selfdefence, as it would be difficult to reconcile the potential ongoing damage caused by space debris as the aftermath of the defensive action with the proportionality principle. 135 In a contribution on the environmental dimension of space arms control, Su and Zhu 136 point out that the space environment is significantly more fragile than earth due to its "poor capability of regeneration" and that the "overproliferation of space debris would render the Earth orbit unusable" for future generations. 137 They therefore regard a weapons-free outer space (which would include the banning of the testing, deployment and use of space-based weapons and ASATs) as a prerequisite for the sustainable use of outer space. 138 Due to the legal uncertainties relating to the use and control of the right to selfdefence in outer space, the submission by Filho 139 that this right should preferably not be used in outer space and that states should reach an agreement to ban preventative or pre-emptive self-defence in outer space is supported. The grave consequences that the application of the right to self-defence may have in outer space require a sui 133 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 528. 134 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 528. research indicating that "space debris in orbits higher than about 800 km above the Earth's surface will be up there for decades, above 1,000 km for centuries, and above 1,500 km effectively forever. … The last few decades have witnessed dramatic proliferation of space debris. Now over 21,000 orbiting debris larger than 10 cm in diameter are tracked; and as estimated there are over 100,000 pieces larger than a marble". Duberti 2011 Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law generis interpretation of article 51 in the context of outer space. The unique circumstances in outer space make it difficult to apply article 51 (which was formulated with reference to earth-based circumstances) in space. It is therefore suggested that peaceful uses of outer space should be interpreted to mean a prohibition on the use of all forms of force in outer space, similar to the prohibition in the Antarctic Treaty referred to earlier.
It is doubtful, however, if states will be willing to merely waive their right to selfdefence in outer space. It is inconceivable that a state will not exercise this right in the event of an armed attack against its space assets (or even the threat of such an attack). The importance that states attach to this right is evident, for example, from Because of the difficulties in reaching international consensus on the military uses of outer space (including issues such as self-defence), it is proposed that as an interim measure the United Nations Security Council should adopt a binding resolution in this regard. The increasing potential for conflict concerning the security of space assets, and the consequent weaponisation of outer space, is becoming a real concern. The result will inevitably be "a less secure outer space" 142 with serious implications for the Moreover, the conflict will in all probability not be confined to outer space, but may escalate to earth-based armed conflict, which will be a serious threat to international peace and security. In order to avoid this, the Security Council should adopt a resolution in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter to reaffirm the prohibition of all forms of armed conflict in outer space (including the use of self-defence). 143 The adoption of such a resolution will inevitably depend on the political will especially of the major space powers such as the United States, Russia and China. It is encouraging to note, however, that specifically Russia and China have in the past supported the prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space. 144 As early as in the 1980s Russia (as the then Soviet Union) made specific proposals to the United Nations General Assembly on the banning of space weapons (including earth-based weapons targeting space) in order to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space. 145 On its part, China in 2003 made a public declaration against the militarisation of space and calling for the use of space technologies for peaceful purposes. 146 Yet in view of the current space policy of the USA which provides for the use of space weapons in support of its defence and national security objectives, 147 it would be premature to regard these actions as reflecting the collective viewpoint of all the space powers. 148 As pointed out here below, the motives of China and Russia for supporting the non-weaponisation of outer space are also questioned by some.
Space weapon
143 Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law points out that the United Nations should make a shift from its current strategy of issuing regular calls for the prevention of an armed race in space, to "the establishment of rigorously enforced moratorium on the deployment of weapons in outer space, which might offer a window of opportunity to negotiate a total ban of weapons in outer space. Naturally, this would require a significant shift in political will among the major space-faring nations, which although a difficult task, should be encouraged through negotiation and broader political pressure". Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 27-28. 147 Gertz 2014 http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-opposes-new-draft-treaty-from-chinaand-russia-banning-space-weapons/.
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As Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law 28 point out "the future of space security will depend on how effectively all States strive for the 'de-weaponization' of outer space and pressure the major space-faring nations, and how those nations are able to set aside their differences".
Although it is generally accepted that the weaponisation of outer space should be regarded as unlawful, the meaning of the term "space weapon" is not defined in any of the current space treaties, nor in any domestic legislation. 149 If a broad approach is followed, a space weapon would include any "space and terrestrial-based systems capable of destroying, damaging or interfering with space assets". 150 In contrast, a narrower definition would limit a space weapon to "space systems whose specific goal it is to destroy and damage an object in space". 151 However, as was already mentioned above, most space equipment has a dual purpose -both civilian and military. As a result, most space objects designed to be used for peaceful purposes in outer space have the potential to become space weapons and destroy or damage other active space systems. 152 This ambiguity is further highlighted by the strategy to place weapons temporarily in orbit for a limited number of days or weeks, or to use technologies that merely disrupt the space activities of other space actors, for example, by using passive measures such as encryption and earth-based jamming. 153 Tronchetti 154 therefore proposes a broad definition of the term space weapon as: [a]ny device, whether in space or on Earth, created or modified to cause permanent or temporary physical or operational damage to an object in outer space by means of physical contact, projection of energy, or any kind of voluntary interference.
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Although the advantage of this definition is that it is broad enough to include both space and earth-based systems, and that it refers to the destruction as well as the temporary inoperability of space objects as a result of an attack, 156 it is not clear whether it refers only to devices which have the specific purpose of being used as a weapon or whether it also includes a space object which has the potential to cause damage to assets in outer space.
An attempt to provide a treaty-based definition of the term "space weapon" may be found in the 2008 Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects. 157 The draft document defines a "space weapon" as any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth's atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage on them … 158 Several concerns have been raised with the Draft Treaty, however, including the following. 159 The draft document does not explicitly prohibit the testing and development of anti-satellite weapons, but allows for their research, development, production and terrestrial storage. Only the threat or use of such weapons against space objects for hostile purposes is prohibited. 160 The Draft Treaty thus places the emphasis only on space-based weapons. As a result, dual-use systems, which are not specifically produced to destroy space-objects, do not fall within the Draft Treaty's definition of a "space weapon". 161 155 Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 364. Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 370-371. 160 Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 370.
The definition of a "space weapon" has not been significantly amended in the 2014 Draft Treaty. Article 1(b) now reads as follows: [T] he term "weapon in outer space" means any outer space object or its component produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth's surface or in the air, as well as to eliminate population, components of biosphere important to human existence, or to inflict damage to them by using any principles of physics.
It seems that the revised definition is not much more than a grammatical revision of the 2008 version and thus still does not address the concerns pointed out here above.
One notable change in the 2014 version of article 1(b) is the use of the term "outer space object"; instead of "device" in its description of a space weapon. However, the definition of an "outer space object" in the revised article 1(a) is much more concise and arguably vaguer than its 2008 counterpart, 162 and reads as follows:
[T]he term "outer space object" means any device placed in outer space and designed for operating therein.
163
This vagueness is exacerbated by the fact that a definition for "outer space" has been omitted from the revised Draft Treaty.
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty makes no mention of conventional weapons or any other military systems, but specifically prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth, or the placement of such weapons on celestial bodies. This is most probably due to the preoccupation of states with the dangers of radioactive fallout caused by nuclear tests and the development and use of nuclear weapons at the time of the negotiating of the treaty, when the use of conventional weapons in outer space was not foreseen. 164 It is thus not clear whether the lack of an explicit prohibition on the use of conventional weapons in outer 162 In the of the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (2008) the term "outer space object" is defined as "any device, designed for functioning in outer space, being launched into an orbit around any celestial body, or being in the orbit around any celestial body, or on any celestial body except the Earth, or leaving the orbit around any celestial body towards this celestial body, or moving from any celestial body towards another celestial body, or placed in outer space by any other means …". 163 The definition of a "space object" in a 1(d) of the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972) is equally vague. It defines a "space object" as including the "component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof". 164 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 513-514; Su 2010 Journal of Space Law 267. space suggests that the use of such weapons is implicitly permitted. 165 In this regard, Bourbonnière and Lee 166 argue that the deployment of conventional weapons in earth orbit for peace-keeping purposes under articles VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations will be permissible under article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.
In contrast with nuclear weapons, which are "a defined technology", the legal meaning of the term weapons of mass destruction (which may include radiological, biological and chemical weapons) 167 within the context of the Outer Space Treaty, is not clear. 168 In addition, the prohibition in article IV on the testing of any type of weapon specifically on celestial bodies may, according to some, imply that the prohibition does not apply to such tests in outer void space itself. 169 Friman 170 however, argues that in view of the title of the Outer Space Treaty and its preamble, which sets out the legal boundaries within which the treaty articles must operate, as well as the wording of articles IX and XI of the Outer Space Treaty, 171 the prohibition on the non-peaceful uses of outer space should extend to outer void space. Moreover, as was already pointed out earlier, due to the generation of vast amounts of space debris, the mere testing of space weapons (irrespective of whether it is done on a celestial body or in outer void space) already poses a risk to space security and to the right of other states to use and explore outer space freely. by the USA and Russia) is also not prohibited. 173 Also intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads are not prohibited by the treaty, since they are not placed in (a full) orbit around the earth and therefore fall outside the prohibition in article IV. 174 The ballistic missile defence shield developed by the United States to protect itself and its allies against missile attacks is, however, a more contentious issue, since the kinetic energy interceptors launched into space to destroy enemy missiles also have the potential to be used as anti-satellite weapons. 175 In dealing with the lacunae in article IV, some authors have suggested that, based on the reasoning of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus-case, 176 it may be argued that what is not expressly prohibited under article IV, may be permitted in law. 177 It is agreed with the submission by Su, 178 however, that due to the grave consequences of the weaponisation of outer space (which could eventually lead to an arms race in outer space and even armed conflict on earth) the Lotus principle should not be applicable to outer space. 179
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The way forward?
After the conclusion of the space treaties in the 1960s and 1970s, it became apparent that states were no longer willing to adopt further binding obligations regulating space activities and that international space law could, therefore, be developed only by adopting soft law instruments. 180 As a result of their non-mandatory character, these instruments are generally more easily negotiated by states than is the case with Proponents of a hard-law approach to prevent the weaponisation of outer space, however, maintain that the adoption of a legally binding treaty will be the most effective measure to ensure the non-weaponisation of outer space, as a violation of the treaty would make a state legally responsible towards the other states parties. 184 Notwithstanding the fact that most states are ( Although the Draft Treaty may be regarded as a point of departure in the formulation of a treaty prohibiting the weaponisation of outer space, the criticism that has been raised by governments against the draft document makes it unlikely that it would be easily accepted by the majority of states. 187 The 2008 Draft Treaty was rejected by 181 Dugard International Law 33 describes soft law as "imprecise standards, generated by declarations adopted by diplomatic conferences or resolutions of international organizations, that are intended to serve as guidelines to states in their conduct, but which lack the status of 'law'". Tronchetti "Soft Law" 624 summarises the role of soft law in the general system of international law as follows: "1) it can give guidance on how to interpret and implement existing treaty provisions; 2) it may represent the beginning of a process leading to an international treaty; 3) it may contribute to the formation of customary law; 4) it may be declaratory of existing unwritten rules." Klabbers Introduction to International Institutional Law 202 is of the opinion, however, that the concept soft law should be discarded mainly because it is premised on the jurisprudentially dubious notion that legal rules can be more or less binding, which is not really supported by international tribunals. Furthermore, the fact that soft law is often conceived as informal standards-setting without any control, makes it a convenient tool for the exercise of pure political power.
183 Tronchetti "Soft Law" 627; Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 372. 184 Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 368. Maogoto and Freeland 2008 Air and Space Law propose in this regard that "[w]e must move towards the negotiation of a comprehensive international legal instrument addressing the issues of space weaponization, based on the accepted principle that space is the common heritage of mankind …". Also see Park 2006 Hous J Int'l L 893. 185 Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 386. 186 Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 368-369. the United States' rejection of the Treaty. 189 In addition, there also seems to be still some concern regarding Russia and China's motives with the Draft Treaty, which are considered by some observers as an attempt to limit their adversaries ' military capabilities. 190 Due to the difficulties in creating a binding treaty, the appropriateness of soft law to prevent an arms race in outer space and to protect space assets is also increasingly supported in the area of space security. 191 These soft law guidelines could be drafted in various forms, for example as guidelines or rules of the road, with the purpose of creating transparency in order to avoid "accidental military engagement in outer space", 192 or as codes of conduct which provide certain behavioural and operational rules to be followed by states when conducting space activities, 193 or as transparency 188 Reaching Critical Will 2014 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-shhets/critical-issues/ 5448-outer-space. Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 372. 192 Lyall and Larsen Space Law 529-530. 193 For a discussion of some of these soft-law codes see and confidence-building measures (so-called TCBMs) 194 with the purpose of sharing information on the location and scope of space launches and activities, among other things, or information on domestic space policies programmes, in order to improve international relations. 195 In this regard Tronchetti 196 submits as follows:
First and utmost soft law provisions, and in particular TCBMs, are being recognised as a useful tool to enhance space security because they contribute to create mutual understanding and to reduce tensions among States. In particular, these measures diminish and even eliminate the cause for mistrust, fear and miscalculation concerning military activities in outer space and intentions of other States, factors which may generate the perception of an impaired security of national space objects and provide justification for the placement and use of weapons in outer space.
The question obviously remains whether states will be willing to share such information, as the military use of outer space is usually closely linked to national security issues. 197 As with the non-binding space debris mitigation guidelines, it could be argued that soft law rules will have a moral and political value, as there is an expectation that states will comply with its provisions. 198 Non-compliance may be viewed in a negative light by a state's international partners and thus damage the political reputation of the state. 199 Especially in instances where there is an urgent need for legal clarity, a soft law instrument offers a solution as it can be negotiated in a relatively short period of time and implemented immediately, because its applicability is not dependent on ratification by states. 200 It could thus furthermore be argued that soft law guidelines have a legal value, as they impact on the international law-making process by providing the premise on which customary international law may develop, and which 140-142. 195 Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 372. 196 Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 373. 197 In this regard Tronchetti "Soft Law Approach" 375 points out that, similarly, a state's decision to comply with a treaty is also influenced by security and strategic interests. Should a state deem a treaty to be no longer in its interest, it may breach the treaty and bear the consequences or if possible withdraw from it. 198 See in the context of space debris mitigation, Welly 2010 Journal of Space Law 307; Tronchetti "Soft Law" 620. 199 Welly 2010 Journal of Space Law 307. 200 Tronchetti "Soft Law" 626. may eventually lead to the conclusion of a binding treaty. 201 In addition, propositions for the creation of an outer space inspection system or even a world space organisation to ensure the continued peaceful use of outer space should also be revisited. 202 The European Union's draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 203 is a good example of an attempt to regulate the military use of outer space by means of a softlaw instrument. The Code, which will not be legally binding, aims to improve safety and security in outer space by means of principles and guidelines voluntarily agreed upon by states. 204 A number of states, such as Australia, Canada and Japan, have already indicated their support for the Code. Also, the USA seems to be inclined to accept the Code due to its non-binding nature. 205 However, some countries, including Brazil, Russia, India and China, have expressed concerns that the Code could be used as a means to constrain their capacity to undertake future space activities and that the language on self-defence in the Code could encourage an arms race in space. states have disputed the appropriateness of such negotiations within the realm of the United Nations. 207 In its 2013 Report 208 the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) states that the Committee agreed that due to its work in scientific, technical and legal fields, as well as its facilitation of international dialogue on issues relating to the exploration and use of outer space, "it had a fundamental role to play in ensuring that outer space was maintained for peaceful purposes". 209 The view was furthermore expressed by some delegates that the Committee should commence with analysing the "legal basis for and modalities of the exercise of the right to self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as applied to outer space". 210 Some delegates submitted that the Committee was the only United Nations body aimed at promoting the peaceful use of outer space and therefore any concept that violated the legal principles relating to the peaceful use of outer space, such as the concept of the right to self-defence or the use of weapons in outer space, should not be accepted in the Committee, as this would be in contradiction of its fundamental tasks. 211 The view was further expressed that the current outer space legal regime was not adequate to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space and that, in order to ensure the peaceful use of outer space and prevent its militarisation, a binding legal instrument had to be prepared. While some delegates recommended that the Committee cooperate and coordinate in this regard with other United Nations bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament, others were of the opinion that it would be more appropriate if disarmament issues be dealt with exclusively in forums such as the Conference on Disarmament. One delegation even expressed the view that "no actions by the Committee were needed regarding the weaponisation of outer space and that there was no scarcity of appropriate multilateral mechanisms where disarmament could be discussed". Although it could be argued that a change in forum would not change the national stances of states, Park 212 suggests that the creation of a new discussion forum on space security (that would include diplomats, academics, military officers and industry representatives) might place additional, unified pressure specifically on the USA to change its position on space security and the weaponisation of outer space.
Conclusion
It should be apparent from the above exposition that article IV of the Outer Space unique nature of outer space issues, they should not be dealt with in a forum which primarily focuses on earth-based situations.
Although it is agreed with the proponents of a hard law approach that a legally binding instrument should be adopted to regulate the military use of outer space, it is submitted that, as an interim measure, soft law guidelines should be developed to provide a framework for the eventual creation of a consolidated and binding legal instrument on all aspects relating to the use of outer space. In this regard the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea could serve as a valuable example. 215 As Lyall and Larsen 216 observe:
Once one state begins to assert unilateral authority to weaponise outer space with the implicit threat of the use of those weapons, other states will use that precedent to assert their own unilateral authority.
Should this happen, the "point of no return" referred to by President Eisenhower in 1960 may be reached much sooner than anticipated. maintaining peace and security in outer space, but also on earth. Consequently, an international dialogue on the military uses of outer space should be facilitated under the auspices of the UNCOPUOS to address these uncertainties as a matter of urgency. Although it is agreed with the proponents of a hard law approach that a legally binding instrument should be adopted to regulate the military use of outer space, it is submitted that, as an interim measure, soft law guidelines should be developed to provide a framework for the eventual creation of a consolidated and binding legal instrument on all aspects relating to the use of outer space.
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